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State Incarceration of Federal
Prisoners After September 11
WHOSE JAIL IS IT ANYWAY?
Ronald K. Chen'
I. INTRODUCTION
In the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks,
federal law enforcement authorities made aggressive use of
immigration laws to detain aliens suspected of having possible
ties to terrorism, detaining more than 1,200 persons within two
months.' Some were questioned and subsequently released.
Many others, however, were held indefinitely, ostensibly for
overstaying or being out of status under the terms of their visa,
although they normally would not have been incarcerated for
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such relatively minor violations.2 The Department of Justice
adopted a "no bond" policy to hold those who were "of interest"
in the terrorism investigation,3 and as a direct result the
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)' detained 762
aliens5 who were primarily men from Arab or South Asian
countries.' Yet the government never charged any of these so-
called "special interest" detainees with a terrorism-related
offense,' and in the end simply deported almost all to their
country of origin.
Although at first willing to give an aggregate count of
the INS detainees,' the Justice Department soon ordered that
the detainees' individual names be withheld, and a complete
list of those arrested and held by the INS has never been made
public. Attorney General Ashcroft gave two reasons for these
secret detentions: (1) the release of the identities of the
detainees would assist Al Qaeda operatives;9 and (2) such
2 See Amnesty International, Amnesty International's Concerns Regarding
Post September 11 Detentions in the USA, at 2 (Mar. 14, 2002) [hereinafter Amnesty
International Report], available at http://web.amnesty.org/aidoc/aidoc-pdf.nsf]
Index/AMR510442002ENGLISHI$File/AMR5104402.pdf.
3 OIG Report, supra note 1, at 72.
4 On March 1, 2003, the Immigration and Naturalization Service became
part of the Department of Homeland Security and its functions were divided into
various bureaus of that department. Homeland Security Act of 2002, 107 P.L. 296, 116
Stat. 2135 (Nov. 25, 2002).
"Of these 762 aliens, 24 were in INS custody on immigration violations
prior to the September 11 attacks. The remaining 738 aliens were arrested between
September 11, 2001, and August 6, 2002, as a direct result of the FBI's PENTTBOM
investigation" into the September 11 attacks. OIG Report, supra note 1, at 2.
6 See id. at 20.
7 The only person charged with complicity in the terrorist attacks of
September 11, Zacarias Moussaoui, was arrested in Minnesota on August 17, 2001, and
was not a special interest detainee. Some of the detainees were charged with crimes
unrelated to September 11 or other terrorist activity. See, e.g., Terror Network Remains
Crouched in Shadows, USA TODAY, Sept. 28, 2001, at 8A.
" The total number of aliens detained after September 11 is still the subject
of some conjecture. For the first few months after the attacks, the Department of
Justice gave regular reports on the number of aliens detained in connection with the
September 11 investigation. As of November 5, the Justice Department announced that
1,147 people had been detained. Thereafter, however, the Department of Justice ceased
releasing aggregate figures "because the statistics became confusing." OIG Report,
supra note 1, at 1 n.2; see also Terry Frieden, Justice Department Can't Confirm How
Many Detainees Released, CNN.COM, Nov. 5, 2001, available at
http://www.cnn. com/2001/US/ 1/05/inv.detainee. numbers/.
9 General Ashcroft noted:
I am not interested in providing, when we are at war, a list to Osama bin
Laden, the al Qaeda network, of the people that we have detained that would
make in any way easier their effort to kill American citizens - innocent
Americans. That will remain the policy of this department, which will
scrupulously adhere to the law.
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release would violate the privacy interests of the detainees."°
The policy of withholding the names of the INS detainees,
however, met with heavy criticism from editorial pages" and
civil liberties groups. The historical antipathy against such
secret arrests'2 resonated among those who otherwise occupied
opposite ends of the political spectrum. The ACLU sued in
federal court, seeking disclosure under the federal Freedom of
Information Act as well as under the common law and First
Amendment right of access to government information.'3 The
ACLU also sued to overturn a related policy of categorically
closing immigration hearings to the public.
4
The focus of this Article, however, is not on the general
merits of the federal policy refusing to make public the names
of the September 11 detainees, but rather, on the competence
of the federal government, in a manner consistent with both
Briefing With Attorney General John Ashcroft, Federal News Service (Nov. 27, 2001)
[hereinafter Ashcroft Briefing], available at http://www.usdoj.gov/agspeeches2001
agcrisisremarksl_27.htm.
'0 General Ashcroft further noted:
Now, it's very possible that some individuals that we think might be
terrorists might someday, by further investigation, be shown not to be
terrorists. I think it would be inappropriate for us to either advertise the fact
of their detention or to provide the suggestion that they are terrorists in a
way which would be prejudicial to their not only privacy interest but personal
interest.
Id.
" See, eg, Editorial, Justice Deformed; War and the Constitution, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 2, 2001, at D14; Editorial, Secret Detainees; Ashcroft Should Be More
Forthcoming, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Nov. 30, 2001, at 32A; Editorial, An Un-
American Secrecy, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 21, 2001, at B24; Editorial, Secret Detentions
Needlessly Undercut Public Justice, USA TODAY Nov. 2, 2001, at 15A.
12 In a Federalist Paper, Alexander Hamilton commented:
To bereave a man of life . . . or by violence to confiscate his estate, without
accusation or trial, would be so gross and notorious an act of despotism, as
must at once convey the alarm of tyranny throughout the whole nation; but
confinement of the person, by secretly hurrying him to jail, where his
sufferings are unknown or forgotten, is a less public, a less striking, and
therefore a more dangerous engine of arbitrary government.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 84 (Alexander Hamilton) (emphasis in original) (quoting
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND). "The requirement that
arrest books be open to the public is to prevent any 'secret arrests,' a concept odious to
a democratic society ... " Morrow v. District of Columbia, 417 F.2d 728, 741-42 (D.C.
Cir. 1969).
13 Center for Nat'l Sec. Studies v. United States Dep't of Justice, 215 F. Supp.
2d 94 (D.D.C. 2002), affd in part and rev'd in part, 331 F.3d 918 (D.C. Cir. 2003), cert.
denied, 124 S. Ct. 1041 (2004).
14 Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 195 F. Supp. 2d 937 (E.D. Mich. 2002), affd,
303 F.3d 681 (6th Cir. 2002) (holding that the First Amendment grants right of public
access to immigration proceedings); North Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 205 F.
Supp. 2d 288 (D.N.J.), rev'd, 308 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2002) (holding no First Amendment
right of public access to immigration proceedings), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 2215 (2003).
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statutory and constitutional principles illuminating federalism,
to extend its decision of secret detention to govern the
operation of state jails in which it chooses to house federal
detainees, pursuant to voluntary agreements with state
governmental authorities. The unprecedented circumstances
associated with the incarceration of the September 11
detainees created, at least temporarily, the very practical
problem of where to house them when their number exceeded
the capacity of federally-operated facilities." Even under
normal circumstances federal law enforcement agencies,
including the INS, regularly place federal prisoners or
detainees in state facilities pursuant to contracts entered into
with state officials." Of the 762 special interest detainees, a
majority were apparently held in state jails in New Jersey"7
since most of the detainees were arrested in the New York
metropolitan area" and since various counties of New Jersey,
with their excess jail capacity, had previously entered into
intergovernmental service agreements with the INS for this
purpose.
Part II of this Article describes a civil case, in which I
serve as lead counsel, in which plaintiffs sought to enforce
longstanding state statutes mandating public access to the
identity of county jail inmates, and contesting the power of the
federal government to force New Jersey to withhold the names
of federal detainees incarcerated in state jails. Part III gives a
brief summary' of the historical relationship between the
federal and state sovereignties when a federal agency chooses
15 According to Attorney General John Ashcroft, in the ordinary course,
approximately 20,000 people are being held at any one time for immigration violations.
Ashcroft Briefing, supra note 9.
16 See generally 18 U.S.C. § 4002 (2000) (Attorney General may contract with
State for imprisonment, subsistence, care, and proper employment of persons held
under authority of federal law.); 8 U.S.C.S. § 1103(a)(11) (2004) (Attorney General
authorized to make payments for housing, care, and security of persons detained by
Service pursuant to Federal law under agreement with a State or political subdivision
of a State.).
17 The Hudson County Correctional Center in Kearny, New Jersey, and the
Passaic County Jail in Paterson, New Jersey, housed most of the September 11
detainees, with some others housed in the Middlesex County Jail in North Brunswick,
New Jersey. Special interest detainees whom the FBI considered to be especially
dangerous were usually housed in the Metropolitan Detention Center in Brooklyn, NY.
See Anne-Marie Cusac, Ill-treatment on Our Shores; Detainees Arrested After Terrorist
Attacks Lodge Allegations of Abuse While in Custody, THE PROGRESSIVE, Mar. 1, 2002,
at 24.
18 Of the total 762 detainees, 491 were arrested in New York, and 70 in New
Jersey (74%). OIG Report, supra note 1, at 21. The place of arrest of the remainder has
not been disclosed. Id.
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to house federal prisoners or detainees in state institutions.
Part IV addresses the statutory basis for the contention that
the Congress empowered the Commissioner of the INS to pre-
empt state law governing the operation of state jails. Finally,
Part V describes the argument that, under the Tenth
Amendment, the federal government may not coerce state
officials to operate a state institution contrary to state law
without unconstitutionally "commandeering" the apparatus of
state sovereignty and police power.
II. THE CASE: ACLU OF NEW JERSEY, INC. V. COUNTY OF
HUDSON
In ACLU of New Jersey, Inc. v. County of Hudson," the
plaintiffs sought to compel the sheriffs and wardens of the
county jails of Hudson and Passaic Counties to abide by
provisions of New Jersey state law mandating public disclosure
of the identities of those committed to their care. Since the
nineteenth century, the New Jersey Legislature has mandated
that basic pedigree information relating to inmates housed in
New Jersey county jails be made public. The so-called New
Jersey "Jailkeeper's Statute," enacted in 1898, provides:
The keeper of every jail or other penal or reformatory institution
supported by public moneys of any county or municipality, shall keep
a book provided by the board of freeholders in the county where the
institution shall be, in which he shall set forth the date of entry, date
of discharge, the description, age, birthplace and such other
information as he may be able to obtain as to the inmates committed
to his care, which book shall be exposed in a conspicuous place in the
institution and shall be open to public inspection. °
Similarly, New Jersey administrative regulations
required that the name, number, place of incarceration, and
other objective information regarding inmates in county jails
shall be available for public inspection and copying.2 And since
1877, a New Jersey statute has required that county sheriffs
19 No. HUD-L-463-02 (N.J. Super. Ct. filed Jan. 22, 2002).
20 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:8-16 (West 2002).
21 The administrative provision provided: "The following information and
documents regarding an adult inmate or parolee shall be available for public inspection
and copying: 1. Name; 2. Number; 3. Sentence; 4. Place of incarceration; 5. Order of
commitment; and 6. Any documents filed in a court of competent jurisdiction." N.J.
ADMIN. CODE tit. 10A, § 1OA:31-6.5(a) (2002).
This administrative provision, however, has since been amended to remove
the unconditional right of public access to inmate names.
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and jailkeepers record the names of all federal prisoners
committed to county jails," which records must then be made
public pursuant to New Jersey's Right To Know Law.' Because
the Jailkeeper's Statute, by its terms, creates an unqualified
and absolute right of public access to the roster of inmates
housed in county jails, it provided a seemingly indefeasible
mechanism to force the state jailers to disclose the identities of
"the inmates committed to his care."
In December 2001, the ACLU of New Jersey made a
formal request to inspect the records of inmates held in the
Hudson County Correctional Center and the Passaic County
Jail, where the largest number of INS detainees were being
held. The local sheriffs refused these requests, claiming that
such information was under the exclusive control of the INS.
The ACLU then filed suit on January 22, 2002, in the Superior
Court of New Jersey, Hudson County, naming as defendants
only the county sheriffs and wardens who operate the jails
according to state law. No federal officer or agency was
impleaded.
The cause of action was distinctively local in character.
In New Jersey practice, an "action in lieu of prerogative writs"'
is the procedural device by which the state's courts review the
actions of state or local governmental agencies and officers to
ensure that such agencies are acting within their jurisdiction
and according to law. Akin to a common law petition for writ of
22 The statute provides:
Each such sheriff and keeper shall, on or before the first days of April and
October, make out the names of all prisoners who, since the last settlement,
shall have been committed to his custody, under the authority of the United
States, and the time they shall have been respectively confined, with an
account of the amount thereof, at fifty cents per month for the use and
keeping of such jail, for every person so committed, together with an account
of their subsistence, at the rate established by law for state prisoners, and
transmit the same to the United States marshal for the proper district, for
payment.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:8-2 (West 2002).
13 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 47: 1A-2 (West 2002). The Right-to-Know Law in effect at
the time required that "all records which are required by law to be made, maintained
or kept on file" by a government body be made public. Since N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:8-2
expressly requires that the names of federal prisoners housed in New Jersey jails be
recorded, the Right-to-Know Law thereby mandated public disclosure of those records.
The Right-to-Know Law has since been superseded by an even more
expansive Open Public Records Act, 2001 N.J. Laws 404 (2002), which requires
disclosure of any documents regularly kept by a state agency, regardless of whether it
was required to do so by law. Both the Right-to-Know Law and the Open Public
Records Act contained exemptions for certain documents, including documents related
to ongoing law enforcement investigations.
14 See N.J. COURT RULE 4:69 (2002).
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mandamus, the complaint demanded the performance of a
ministerial act or duty, namely non-discretionary obedience by
the county jail officials to the mandate of a state statute
requiring disclosure of the names and other identifying
information of all the inmates of the jails then in their care,
including those housed on behalf of the INS in accordance with
intergovernmental service agreements.25 Although the United
States was not named as a party to the action, it sought and
was granted defendant-intervenor status, and in effect became
the principal counsel for the defendants.
On March 26, 2002, Superior Court Assignment Judge
Arthur N. D'Italia heard argument on the cross-motions for
summary judgment and rendered a bench opinion the same
afternoon, granting the plaintiffs partial summary judgment.26
The trial judge found that, in referring to "inmates committed
to [the jailer's] care," the New Jersey Legislature intended to
include all persons housed in the county jail, including federal
prisoners or detainees. He thereby rejected the United States'
contention that the statute applied only to inmates
incarcerated in county jails pursuant to state criminal
processes." Initially, Judge D'Italia granted the United States'
motion for a stay pending appeal. On April 12, 2002, however,
during a hearing to settle the form of order, Judge D'Italia
25 See Intergovernmental Service Agreement between County of Hudson and
the U.S. Department of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service (Agreement
No. ACB-5-I-0001); Intergovernmental Service Agreement between Passaic County Jail
and U.S. Department of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service (Jan. 28,
1985).
26 The trial judge originally granted summary judgment on the complaint's
first cause of action under N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:8-16 and second cause of action under
N.J. ADMiN. CODE § 1OA:31-6.5, but granted summary judgment in favor of defendants
on the third cause of action under the New Jersey Right-to-Know Law, N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 47:1A-1 to 4; and dismissed the fourth cause of action under the common-law right of
access to government records. On April 12, 2002, however, Judge D'Italia informed
counsel that he was issuing a revised written opinion that would supersede the oral
opinion rendered on March 26, and noted that he was entering summary judgment in
favor of plaintiffs on the first three causes of action, including the third cause of action
based upon the Right-To-Know Law. ACLU of New Jersey v. County of Hudson, No.
HUD-L-463-02 (N.J. Super. Ct. filed Jan. 22, 2002).
27 In his bench opinion, Judge D'Italia held:
The argument... that the statute applies only to inmates charged with state
crimes and being held as pre-trial detainees pursuant to state charges or
those sentenced to prison pursuant to state law is rejected. The statute
contains no such qualifying language. It refers to all inmates committed to
the care of the keeper of the jail without regard to the authority by which the
inmate is committed, whether it be federal, state or local.
ACLU of New Jersey v. County of Hudson, No. HUD-L-463-02 (N.J. Super. Ct.
filed Jan. 22, 2002).
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announced that he had reconsidered the stay pending appeal.
In light of the need for timely action, he granted a limited stay
of ten days, after which he ordered the state jailors to comply
with the state law.
On April 17, 2002, the United States and the various
county defendants filed notices of appeal and cross-appeal to
the Appellate Division of the New Jersey Superior Court. That
same day in Washington D.C., however, INS Commissioner
James W. Ziglar signed an emergency interim regulation,
without following the notice and comment period normally
required under the federal Administrative Procedures Act.28
The regulation provided:
No person, including any state or local government entity or any
privately operated detention facility, that houses, maintains,
provides services to, or otherwise holds any detainee on behalf of the
Service (whether by contract or otherwise), and no other person who
by virtue of any official or contractual relationship with such person
obtains information relating to any detainee, shall disclose or
otherwise permit to be made public the name of, or other information
relating to, such detainee. Such information shall be under the
control of the Service and shall be subject to public disclosure only
pursuant to the provisions of applicable federal laws, regulations
and executive orders. Insofar as any documents or other records
contain such information, such documents shall not be public
records. This section applies to all persons and information identified
or described in it, regardless of when such persons obtained such
information, and applies to all requests for public disclosure of such
information, including requests that are the subject of proceedings
pending as of April 17, 2002.'
The rule therefore prohibited all persons, including state jail
officials, from disclosing basic identifying information
regarding inmates committed to their care, and made clear
that it "supersede [d] State or local law relating to the release of
such information."30 Moreover, that the regulation applied to
"requests that are the subject of proceedings pending as of
April 17, 2002," was an obvious reference to the pending appeal
in County of Hudson.
Faxed copies of Commissioner Ziglar's regulation were
provided immediately to the Appellate Division, with a request
5 U.S.C. § 553 (2000).
29 Interim Rule, Release of Information Regarding Immigration and
Naturalization Service Detainees in Non-Federal Facilities, 67 Fed. Reg. 19,508 (Apr.
22, 2002), as confirmed at 68 Fed. Reg. 4364 (Jan. 29, 2003) (codified at 8 C.F.R. §
236.6) [hereinafter Interim Rule].
30 Id. at 19,510.
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by the United States that it stay Judge D'Italia's order pending
expedited appeal. Mindful of the possibility that INS detainees
might be deported or transferred outside of New Jersey during
the pendency of the appeal, on April 19, 2003, the Appellate
Division held a teleconference with counsel, in which it
attempted to fashion a mutually agreeable temporary standstill
agreement while the appeal was heard.3' When no such
agreement could be reached, the appellate court issued a stay
of the lower court order on the condition that the status quo be
maintained - that no INS detainee be removed from his or her
present confinement without consent. The purpose of the
requirement, the court later explained, "was simply to forestall
the eventuality that the individual rights and interests at the
heart of the complaint for relief would become moot in ways
that would unreasonably disadvantage the detainees in respect
of the fundamental rights asserted on their behalfs."32
The response of the INS in the following days to the
conditions imposed by the Appellate Division was somewhat
draconian. It forbade any detainee housed in the Hudson or
Passaic County jails from leaving those facilities, even if the
detainee was willing to accept voluntary departure from the
United States to their home country, and even if the detainee
had been granted release on bond by an immigration judge. At
least one detainee who had agreed to voluntary departure and
who was literally in the departure lounge of JFK International
Airport waiting to return home, was reincarcerated in the
county jail where she had been originally kept, ostensibly in
order to abide literally by the stay order. 3 A second
teleconference with the Appellate Division quickly ensued, in
31 As the Appellate Division itself described the teleconference in a
subsequent memorandum opinion:
Cognizant of the important and fragile interests and rights claimed on both
sides of the case (e.g., the government's claims of national security, etc.; and
the needs asserted on behalf of the detainees, inter alia, for access to the
advice of counsel and the services of consular personnel) this court sought, in
a teleconference with counsel on April 19, 2002, to elicit the agreement of the
parties to an interim solution which would preserve the status quo, i.e., short
of the full disclosure mandated by the trial court, yet, sensibly serving the
individual interests in representation to the greatest extent possible. Such an
interim solution on an agreed-upon basis could not be achieved, however.
ACLU of N.J. v. County of Hudson, No. A-4100-00T5, 2002 N.J. Super. LEXIS 201
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Apr. 29, 2002).
32 id.
3 See Jim Edwards, Stay on Release of Detainee Names Leads to Chaos for
Sept. 11 Cases; ACLU, INS at Odds Over Meaning of Appellate Order, N.J. L.J., Apr.
29, 2002, at 337.
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which the court provided further clarification of its April 19
order: "It is not the court's intention to limit unduly the
government's discharge of its essential functions; nor will the
court tolerate any steps pendente lite that worsen the
procedural lot of the detainees before the ultimate issues are
resolved." The court maintained its original order, but made
clear that detainees could be removed from the jails under
certain conditions in which they themselves consented to the
removal, including voluntary departure or release on bond.5
Oral argument before the Appellate Division was held
on May 10, 2002. On June 12, 2002, the court issued an opinion
in which it upheld the efficacy of the interim regulation
promulgated on April 17, finding that the century-old New
Jersey state statute mandating public access to jail rosters had
been retroactively pre-empted by Commissioner Ziglar's sweep
of the pen, and it therefore reversed the trial court's order
based solely on application of the new federal rule." The New
Jersey Supreme Court ordered expedited consideration of the
petition for certification and denied review on July 9, 2002. The
ACLU elected not to seek certiorari in the United States
Supreme Court.
Of all the statements made by the federal government
in the course of the litigation, perhaps the most noteworthy,
and also the most troubling, was the statement required under
Executive Order 13,13217 when the interim regulation was first
promulgated:
'4 ACLU of N.J. v. County of Hudson, No. A-4100-00T5, 2002 N.J. Super.
LEXIS 201 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Apr. 29, 2002).
35 The stay order was refined to permit the following:
(1) The removal of any detainee who has agreed to voluntary departure.
(2) the removal of any detainee with a final removal order who exhibits his
consent to such removal by signing a form setting forth that consent.
(3) the removal of any detainee who is authorized to leave the jail on bond.
(4) the temporary removal of any detainee, such as for transportation to
immigration or other court hearings, medical matters, or the like.
(5) the removal of any detainee who is actually represented by counsel.
Id.
36 799 A.2d 629 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002), cert. denied, 803 A.2d 1162
(N.J. 2002).
37 Exec. Order No. 13,132 (Aug. 4, 1999), 64 Fed. Reg. 43,255 (Aug. 10, 1999).
President Clinton issued the executive order "to ensure that the principles of
federalism established by the Framers guide the executive departments and agencies
in the formulation and implementation of policies ... " Id. at 43,255. In particular,
section 6(c) of the order provides:
To the extent practicable and permitted by law, no agency shall promulgate
any regulation that has federalism implications and that preempts State law,
unless the agency, prior to the formal promulgation of the regulation,
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This rule will not have substantial direct effects on the States, on the
relationship between the National Government and the States, or on
the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various
levels of government. This rule merely pertains to the public
disclosure of information concerning Service detainees housed,
maintained or otherwise served in state or local government or
privately operated detention facilities under any contract or other
agreement with the Service. In effect, the rule will relieve state or
local government entities of responsibility for the public release of
information relating to any immigration detainee being housed or
otherwise maintained or provided service on behalf of the Service.
Instead, the rule reserves that responsibility to the Service with
regard to all Service detainees. Therefore, in accordance with section
6 of Executive Order 13132, it is determined that this rule does not
have sufficient Federalism implications to warrant the preparation
of a federalism summary impact statement.38
The contention that a federal regulation expressly pre-
empting a state statute that governs the way that state officers
operate state jails will not have serious federalism implications
is facially remarkable. Indeed, the observation that "the rule
will relieve state or local government entities of responsibility
for the public release of information" is functionally equivalent
to the observation that the federal rule relieved state and local
government entities of the responsibility to abide by the
dictates of state law. The result in County of Hudson has
potentially profound implications for traditional assumptions
about the allocation of power between the federal and state
sovereignties in one of the most basic governmental functions -
operating places of incarceration.
(1) consulted with State and local officials early in the process of
developing the proposed regulation;
(2) in a separately identified portion of the preamble to the
regulation as it is to be issued in the Federal Register, provides to
the Director of the Office of Management and Budget a federalism
summary impact statement, which consists of a description of the
extent of the agency's prior consultation with State and local
officials, a summary of the nature of their concerns and the agency's
position supporting the need to issue the regulation, and a
statement of the extent to which the concerns of State and local
officials have been met; and
(3) makes available to the Director of the Office of Management and
Budget any written communications submitted to the agency by
State and local officials.
Id. at 43,258.
38 Interim Rule, supra note 29, at 19,511.
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III. THE HISTORICAL FEDERAI/STATE RELATIONSHIP IN
HOUSING FEDERAL PRISONERS IN STATE JAILS
As Justice Scalia noted in Printz v. United States," the
practice of voluntarily housing federal prisoners in state jails
has a long history:
On September 23, 1789 - the day before its proposal of the Bill of
Rights - the First Congress enacted a law aimed at obtaining state
assistance of the most rudimentary and necessary sort for the
enforcement of the new Government's laws: the holding of federal
prisoners in state jails at federal expense. Significantly, the law
issued not a command to the States' executive, but a
recommendation to their legislatures. Congress "recommended to the
legislatures of the several States to pass laws, making it expressly
the duty of the keepers of their gaols, to receive and safe keep
therein all prisoners committed under the authority of the United
States," and offered to pay 50 cents per month for each prisoner.
Moreover, when Georgia refused to comply with the request,
Congress's only reaction was a law authorizing the marshal in any
State that failed to comply with the Recommendation of September
23, 1789, to rent a temporary jail until provision for a permanent one
could be made."0
From the outset of our constitutional experience,
therefore, reception of federal prisoners in state jails was
understood to be the result of voluntary assistance provided to
the federal government by a coequal sovereign. "The Framers'
experience under the Articles of Confederation had persuaded
them that using the States as the instruments of federal
governance was both ineffectual and provocative of federal-
state conflict." Moreover, incarceration was understood to be
one of the most basic tools of governance. In the place of direct
federal control over the mechanisms of state government,
therefore, federal prisoners were housed in state jails purely at
the discretion of state legislatures or state jailers, as a matter
of free contract and agreement.
In the exercise of that discretion, most states have
provided by statute for housing of federal prisoners in their
jails, and have either directed or permitted state jailers to
39 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
40 Id. at 909-10 (internal citations omitted).
41 Id. at 919.
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receive federal prisoners.4 2 New Jersey, for instance, included a
typical provision in the Sheriffs Act of 1877.
Each sheriff and keeper of a jail in any county of this state shall
receive all prisoners committed to his custody by authority of the
United States and safely keep them until discharged in due course of
the laws of the United States. Any sheriff or keeper who neglects or
refuses to perform the services and duties required of him by this
section, or who offends in the premises shall be subject to like
penalties, forfeitures and actions as if such prisoners had been
committed under authority of this state.3
Thus, unlike other states that permitted but did not
require its sheriffs and jailers to receive federal prisoners, '
New Jersey commands its inferior officers to receive those
prisoners, and holds them responsible as if the prisoners were
detained by the state. Nevertheless, the state officer was
always understood to be acting pursuant to his state
legislature's command, rather than as a servant of the federal
sovereignty. In Board of Chosen Freeholders of Hudson County
v. Kaiser,5 for instance, a county sheriff claimed that he should
be able to keep excess monies paid to him by the federal
government for housing federal prisoners, contending that he
was an agent of the United States Marshal and not a state
official. The state court disagreed:
[Tihe county jail is not furnished to the sheriff to conduct a private
business in, and ... if his only authority to receive federal prisoners
within its walls was a private bargain made with the United States
42 E.g. ALA. CODE § 14-6-4 (2003); ARIz. REV. STAT. § 31-122 (2004); ARK.
CODE ANN. § 12-41-503 (Michie 2003); CAL. PENAL CODE § 2902 (Dearing 2004); COLO.
REV. STAT. § 17-26-123 (2003); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 19-1930 (2003); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 441.035 (Michie 2004); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:707 (2004); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. TIT.
30-A, § 1554 (West 2004); MICH. COMP. LAws § 801.101 (2004); MISS. CODE ANN. § 19-
25-81 (2004); Mo. REV. STAT. § 221.270 (West 2004); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 83-420
(Michie 2003); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 211.060 (Michie 2004); N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 612
(Consol. 2004); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 162-34 (2004); OKL. STAT. ANN. TIT. 57, § 16 (West
2004); ORE. REV. STAT. § 169.540 (2003); S.C. CODE ANN. § 23-19-20 (Law. Co-op. 2003);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 41-4-105 (2004); TEX. LOCAL GOv'T CODE ANN. § 351.043 (Vernon
2004); VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-79 (Michie 2004); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 7-8-8 (Michie 2003);
Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 18-6-305 (Michie 2003).
43 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:8-2 (2002). This provision is first found in the Sheriffs
Act of 1877, N.J. REV. STAT. § 33, at 1105 (1877).
Georgia's original reluctance, noted in Printz, to house federal prisoners
apparently survives to some extent to this day. The current Georgia statute provides:
"The keeper of a county jail may decline to receive a person from the custody of anyone
acting under the authority of the United States government. He may receive the person
if the consent of the authority having control of county matters is first obtained." GA.
CODE ANN. § 42-4-9 (2002).
45 69 A. 25 (N.J. Sup. Ct.), affd, 71 A. 1133 (N.J. 1908).
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marshal, his conduct would be a clear violation of official duty. But
such is not the case. Section 33 of the act concerning sheriffs (Gen.
Stat., p.3 1 1 7 ) makes it the duty of the sheriff of every county to
receive all persons committed to his custody by the authority of the
United States. He takes them into his custody as sheriff; he remains
responsible for them as sheriff, and all moneys paid to him on their
account are paid to him as, and received by him as, sheriff. That
being so, moneys paid to him by the federal government in excess of
what was needed for the food and care of federal prisoners was paid
to him as compensation for services rendered and duties performed
with relation to them as sheriff.....
The New Jersey court therefore rejected the contention that, in
housing federal prisoners, the sheriff enjoyed a dual existence
as part federal officer and part state officer. The state jailer
serves a unitary master, and is answerable solely to the state
sovereignty.
Federal courts have consistently adopted the same
model of state jail officials as acting purely in their capacities
under state law. In 1815, the Supreme Court observed in
Randolph v. Donaldson7 that:
The keeper of a state jail is neither in fact nor in law the deputy of
the [United States] marshal. He is not appointed by nor removable
at the will of the marshal. When a prisoner is regularly committed to
a state jail by the marshal, he is no longer in the custody of the
marshal, nor controlable by him. The marshal has no authority to
command or direct the keeper in respect to the nature of the
imprisonment.48
This characterization of state jail officials as acting
exclusively as creatures of state sovereignty even when housing
federal prisoners has been embraced in modern cases as a
matter of federal statutory interpretation by the United States
Supreme Court. In Logue v. United States," the Court
46 Id. at 28.
47 13 U.S. 76 (1815).
4 Id. at 86. Similarly, in Saunders v. United States, 73 F. 782 (C.C.D. Me.
1896), the federal court observed:
But the [state] jailer is not an officer of the United States, and the
commissioner has no power to call upon him to perform any service. The
United States uses the jails of the state for the confinement of prisoners
under sentence or awaiting trial. The Revised Statutes of the United States
(section 5539) subject prisoners so confined to the same discipline and
treatment as convicts sentenced under the laws of the state, and place them
under the control of the officer having charge of the jail under the laws of the
state.
Id. at 783.
49 412 U.S. 521 (1973). In Logue, a federal prisoner confined in a county jail
pending trial committed suicide, and his parents sued both the state jailer and the
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construed the general federal statute that authorizes federal
law enforcement agencies to enter into contracts with state
authorities to house federal detainees.' In authorizing such
contracts, "Congress . .. clearly contemplated that the day-to-
day operations of the contractor's facilities were to be in the
hands of the contractor, with the [federal] Government's role
limited to the payment of sufficiently high rates to induce the
contractor to do a good job."1 Thus, the Court has found that
such an intergovernmental service agreement "gives the
United States no authority to physically supervise the conduct
of the jail's employees."" Each county defendant in this case is
an "independent contractor who contracts with another to do
something for him but who is not controlled by the other nor
subject to the other's right to control with respect to his
physical conduct in the performance of the undertaking."'
Particularly with respect to the policies and practices regarding
the treatment of federal prisoners, the Court has made it clear
that the state rules govern, an axiom that presumably
embraces state laws, such as the Jailkeeper's Statute, which
mandate the manner of public disclosure of jail records. 5
United States marshal for damages under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §
1346(b), contending that both officers' negligence was the proximate cause of their son's
death. In finding that the state sheriff was an independent contractor of the United
States and therefore not within the control of a federal officer, the Court thereby
concluded that the state officer could not be liable under the FTCA.
50 The statute currently provides:
For the purpose of providing suitable quarters for the safekeeping, care, and
subsistence of all persons held under authority of any enactment of Congress,
the Attorney General may contract, for a period not exceeding three years,
with the proper authorities of any State, Territory, or political subdivision
thereof, for the imprisonment, subsistence, care, and proper employment of
such persons.
18 U.S.C. § 4002 (2000).
At the time that Logue was decided, the statute named the Director of the
Bureau of Prisons as the federal officer authorized to enter into contracts with state
authorities for housing federal prisoners. 18 U.S.C. § 4002 (1976). In 1978, the statute
was amended to substitute the Attorney General for the Director, thus broadening its
scope to include all federal detainees held by the Department of Justice, including
those held by the INS. Pub. L. No. 95-624, § 8, 92 Stat. 3459 (1978).
5' Logue, 412 U.S. at 529.
52 Id. at 530.
53 Id. at 527 n.5 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 2(3) (1958)).
New Jersey is not unique in providing, by statute, for the public disclosure
of the identities of inmates held in state institutions, and the existence of such
provisions could hardly have been a surprise to federal authorities. Over fifty years
ago, New York adopted a law requiring the maintenance of public records on prisoners,
which now provides that:
Each keeper [of a local correctional facility] shall keep a daily record, to be
provided at the expense of the county, of the commitments and discharges of
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To save expense and travel, the Federal Government has found it
convenient with the consent of the respective States to use state
prisons in which to confine many of its prisoners, and the Attorney
General is the agent of the Government to make the necessary
contracts to carry this out. In order to render the duty thus assumed
by the state governments as free from complication as possible, the
actual authority over, and the discipline of, the federal prisoners
while in the state prison are put in the state prison authorities. If
the treatment or discipline is not satisfactory, the Attorney General
can transfer them to another prison, but while they are there, they
must be as amenable to the rules of the prison as are the state
prisoners.55
At the most specific level, the intergovernmental service
agreements between the United States and Hudson and
Passaic Counties for the housing of INS detainees in effect at
the time County of Hudson was litigated were fully consistent
with the characterization of the Hudson and Passaic County
Jails as purely state entities, not under the control of a federal
agency. The Hudson County agreement provided, for instance:
all prisoners delivered to his charge, which shall contain the date of entrance,
name, offense, term of sentence, fine, age, sex, place of birth, color, social
relations, education, secular and religious, for what and by whom committed,
how and when discharged, trade or occupation, whether so employed when
arrested, number of previous convictions. The daily record shall be a public
record, and shall be kept permanently in the office of the keeper.
N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 500-f (Consol. 2004).
Similarly, a Louisiana statute, initially enacted in 1928, requires every jail
to keep a book setting forth the name and other information "as to each prisoner
received" and provides that "[t]he book and booking information summaries shall
always be open for public inspection." LA. CODE CRiM. PROC. ANN. art. 228(B) (West
2004). A New Mexico statute, successor to a similar law enacted in 1961, provides that
"[e]ach county sheriff, jail administrator or independent contractor shall keep a written
record showing the exact time of confinement and release of each prisoner incarcerated
in the jail under his jurisdiction." N.M. STAT. ANN. § 4-44-19 (Michie 2004). A Nebraska
statute, originally part of a law enacted in 1866, requires the sheriff of each jail to keep
"a suitable book to be called the jail register, in which he or she shall enter (1) the
name of each prisoner, with the date and cause of his or her commitment .... ." NEB.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 47-106 (Michie 2003). See also MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 127, § 5,
(originally enacted in 1784); ALA. CODE § 36-22-8 (2004); D.C. CODE ANN. § 5-113.01
(2004) (requiring record keeping); D.C. CODE ANN. § 5-113.06 (2004) (stating that the
records "shall be open to the public inspection"). Congress, in enacting the predecessor
statute to D.C. CODE ANN. § 5-113.01, noted the underlying justification for making
arrest records public:
It is felt that the keeping of such records and their availability to the public
should be matters of law and not of administrative discretion, both for the
protection of the public against secret arrests and to guard against the abuse
in any way of the arrest power.
H. REP. No. 2332, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1954). See also, White v. United States, 164
U.S. 100, 104 (1896) (recognizing that then-sections 4537, 4538, 4539 and 4555 of the
Criminal Code of Alabama required a local jailor to keep such a register).
Ponzi v. Fessenden, 258 U.S. 254, 264 (1922).
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The contractor will provide housing, safekeeping, subsistence and
other services for INS detainee(s) within its facility . . . consistent
with the types and levels of services and programs routinely afforded
its own population, and fully consistent with all applicable laws,
standards, policies, procedures and court orders applicable to its
facility ... unless, or as specifically modified by this Agreement.'
Admission and discharge of INS detainee(s) shall be fully consistent
with the Contractors policies and procedures, and shall ensure
positive identification and recording of both detainee(s) and
officer(s).57
Similarly, the Passaic County agreement provided:
The County agrees to accept and provide for the secure custody, care
and safekeeping of USINS detainees in accordance with state and
local laws, standards, policies, procedures, or court orders applicable
to the operations of the facility.'
It is evident from the contractual agreement that the United
States not only consented to, but indeed mandated, that
Hudson and Passaic County Jails keep the records pertaining
to inmates committed to their care pursuant to the federal
agreements in accordance with state law.
Thus, pursuant to (a) the state statutes that first
authorized local jailers to cooperate with federal authorities
and receive federal detainees in local facilities, (b) the federal
statutes that authorized the Attorney General to solicit such
voluntary cooperation from state officers, and (c) the actual
agreements entered into by Hudson and Passaic Counties for
the housing of INS detainees, two consistent characterizations
of the relationship between federal and state officers emerge:
(1) The state jailers were exclusively officers of the state
sovereignty, and not subject to the control or command of the
federal authorities in the manner in which federal detainees
were handled while in state custody.
(2) It was the expectation of the federal authorities
when entering into contracts with the state jailers that state
and local laws, policies and practices would be applied in the
treatment of federal prisoners held by state jails, and that, for
Intergovernmental Service Agreement between County of Hudson and U.S.
Department of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service (Agreement No. ACB-
5-1-0001) arts. II(1), III(1).
57 Id. art. IV(,).
58 Intergovernmental Service Agreement between Passaic County Jail and




all essential purposes, such federal prisoners would be treated
identically to state prisoners.
Given the venerable heritage of these two propositions,
it would seem to have been well established, both under
relevant state and federal statutes, and under the assumptions
undergirding federal-state relations since the infancy of the
nation, that federal agencies neither sought, nor were
empowered, to instruct state jailers on the manner of operation
of their institutions. That historical understanding was
severely tested by the interim regulation, promulgated on April
17, 2002, in order to address the consequences of one case.
IV. STATUTORY AUTHORIZATION FOR PRE-EMPTION OF THE NEW
JERSEY JAILKEEPER'S STATUTE BY ADMINISTRATIVE
REGULATION
The weighty considerations of federalism usually invite
considerable rhetorical flourish in cases where congressional
intent to permit pre-emption is not express. As the Supreme
Court held in Gregory v. Ashcroft:
[Ihf Congress intends to alter the "usual constitutional balance
between the States and the Federal Government," it must make its
intention to do so "unmistakably clear in the language of the
statute." Congress should make its intention "clear and manifest" if
it intends to pre-empt the historic powers of the States . . "In
traditionally sensitive areas, such as legislation affecting the federal
balance, the requirement of clear statement assures that the
legislature has in fact faced, and intended to bring into issue, the
critical matters involved in the judicial decision.""9
This plain statement rule is nothing more than an acknowledgment
that the States retain substantial sovereign powers under our
constitutional scheme, powers with which Congress does not readily
interfere.'
Thus, many cases speak of a heavy presumption against pre-
emption of state law, particular in areas traditionally
committed to state police power." And "[iut is difficult to
imagine an activity in which a State has a stronger interest, or
one that is more intricately bound up with state laws,
'9 501 U.S. 452, 460-61 (1991) (quoting Will v. Mich. Dept. of State Police,
491 U.S. 58, 65 (1989)) (internal citations omitted).
6o Id. at 461.
61 See, e.g., Hillsborough County v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707,
715 (1985).
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regulations, and procedures, than the administration of its
prisons ."'62
In determining whether a federal administrative
regulation pre-empts pre-existing state law, however, the cases
yield a surfeit of axioms and often conflicting guidance;
consequently, they are difficult to rationalize into a coherent
framework. It is certainly true that "[fiederal regulations have
no less pre-emptive effect than federal statutes."' But the
Court also cautions with equal assurance that a federal agency
"literally has no power to act, let alone pre-empt the validly
enacted legislation of a sovereign State, unless and until
Congress confers power upon it." In determining whether
Congress intended to confer that power, however, there is a
strange analytical disconnect. When the issue is whether
Congress itself intends to displace state law, then the federal
statute effecting pre-emption must usually speak with a loud
voice,' as the "plain statement" rule operates to create a
"presumption against pre-emption."
But when an individual federal administrator, acting
pursuant to a general delegation of regulatory authority by
Congress, decides to pre-empt a state law, then the
presumption against pre-emption is vitiated.
Where Congress has directed an administrator to exercise his
discretion, his judgments are subject to judicial review only to
determine whether he has exceeded his statutory authority or acted
arbitrarily. When the administrator promulgates regulations
intended to pre-empt state law, the court's inquiry is similarly
limited:
If [his] choice represents a reasonable accommodation of
conflicting policies that were committed to the agency's care
by the statute, we should not disturb it unless it appears
62 Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 491-92 (1973).
Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. De La Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982);
Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 699 (1984) (quoting Fidelity Federal).
Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 374 (1986).
61 In the absence of an explicit preemption provision, a federal statute will bedeemed to have superseded state law only where Congress has legislated so thoroughly
across a field "as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the
States to supplement it...," or if an irreconcilable conflict exists between a state law
and a federal statute that address the same general subject area. See generally
Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355 (1986); Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v.
State Energy Res. Conservation and Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190 (1983); Jones v. Rath
Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519 (1977); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947).
The Court has applied the same interpretive principles to determine the pre-emptive




from the statute or its legislative history that the
accommodation is not one that Congress would have
sanctioned.'
Thus, "[a] pre-emptive regulation's force does not depend on
express congressional authorization to displace state law."' So
long as an administrative agency is acting within the general
scope of rule-making authority granted by Congress, it appears
that such delegation implicitly includes within it the power to
pre-empt state law, even absent any clear indication that
Congress intended to bestow such power.
The Supreme Court recently noted the empirical
existence of this odd distinction between legislative and
administrative pre-emption in New York v. FERC, but did little
to justify or explain it.' When Congress - which of course is
elected from the several states and is presumably sensitive to
the proper balance between federal and state sovereignties -
desires to displace state law itself, it is held to the requirement
that it articulate its intent with convincing clarity. It therefore
seems counter-intuitive to not impose a similar requirement of
clearly articulated legislative intent when it delegates rule-
making powers to an unelected administrator in the executive
branch, who is neither inherently responsible nor responsive to
the electoral process. As one federal judge noted in rejecting
one attempt by the Justice Department to overrule state law by
De La Cuesta, 458 U.S. at 153-54 (citations omitted).
67 Id. at 154 (emphasis added).
535 U.S. 1, 18 (2002). The court stated:
Pre-emption of state law by federal law can raise two quite different
legal questions. The Court has most often stated a "presumption against pre-
emption" when a controversy concerned not the scope of the Federal
Government's authority to displace state action, but rather whether a given
state authority conflicts with, and thus has been displaced by, the existence
of Federal Government authority.
The other context in which "pre-emption" arises concerns the rule
"that a federal agency may pre-empt state law only when and if it is acting
within the scope of its congressionally delegated authority[,] . . . [for] an
agency literally has no power to act, let alone pre-empt the validly enacted
legislation of a sovereign State, unless and until Congress confers power upon
it.". . . Such a case does not involve a "presumption against pre-emption,"...
but rather requires us to be certain that Congress has conferred authority on
the agency. As we have explained, the best way to answer such a question -
i.e., whether federal power may be exercised in an area of pre-existing state
regulation - "is to examine the nature and scope of the authority granted by
Congress to the agency." In other words, we must interpret the statute to
determine whether Congress has given FERC the power to act as it has, and
we do so without any presumption one way or the other.
Id. at 17-18.
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administrative fiat, "To allow an attorney general - an
appointed executive whose tenure depends entirely on
whatever administration occupies the White House - to
determine the legitimacy of a particular medical practice
without a specific congressional grant of such authority would
be unprecedented and extraordinary. ' '
In the context of modern statutory schemes in which a
general delegation of rule-making power to an administrative
agency is often quite broad, the absence of such a requirement
that Congress plainly state its intent to permit pre-emption of
state law grants potentially sweeping powers to individual
administrators whose political legitimacy in overruling the
decisions of elected state legislators is questionable at best.
Indeed, as a matter of self-imposed restraint the executive
branch itself has made at least some attempt to restore the
balance of power between the states and the federal
government by applying the traditional presumption against
pre-emption to limit the scope of an administrative agency's
power even when Congress has bestowed it with a general
delegation of rule-making authority. In 1999, President Clinton
issued Executive Order 13,132, encaptioned simply
"Federalism," by which he ostensibly attempted to curb the
potentially immense power of administrative agencies to
unilaterally displace state legislatures. Among the provisions of
Executive Order 13,132 is the following rule of construction:
Section 4. Special Requirements for Preemption.
(a) Agencies shall construe, in regulations and otherwise, a
Federal statute to preempt State law only where the statute
contains an express preemption provision or there is some
other clear evidence that the Congress intended preemption
of State law, or where the exercise of State authority
conflicts with the exercise of Federal authority under the
Federal statute.
(b) Where a Federal statute does not preempt State law (as
addressed in subsection (a) of this section), agencies shall
construe any authorization in the statute for the issuance of
regulations as authorizing preemption of State law by
rulemaking only when the exercise of State authority
69 Oregon v. Ashcroft, 192 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1092 (D. Ore. 2002) (finding
Congress did not intend to authorize Attorney General to pre-empt Oregon's Death
with Dignity Act through administrative regulation), review granted, 368 F.3d 1118
(9th Cir. 2004). See generally Comment, Questioning the Foundation of Attorney




directly conflicts with the exercise of Federal authority
under the Federal statute or there is clear evidence to
conclude that the Congress intended the agency to have the
authority to preempt State law.' °
Thus, Executive Order 13,132 in effect attempts to
restore the "presumption against pre-emption" even when
Congress has made a general delegation of rule-making
authority to an administrative agency, since it requires "clear
evidence to conclude that the Congress intended the agency to
have the authority to pre-empt State law,"" unless the statute
itself pre-empts state law." By its terms however, Executive
Order 13,132 creates no legally enforceable rights, since
Section 11 provides: "This order is intended only to improve the
internal management of the executive branch, and is not
intended to create any right or benefit, substantive or
procedural, enforceable at law by a party against the United
States, its agencies, its officers, or any person."" The
substantive provisions of the presidential edict are therefore
completely hortatory. Even the procedural requirements that
an agency consult with state officials and prepare a federalism
impact statement before promulgating a regulation pre-
empting state law" can be dispensed with unilaterally by the
administrator promulgating the regulation, without the
possibility of review, by the convenient device of finding that
the rule "will not have substantial direct effects on the States,
70 Exec. Order No. 13,132, § 4 (Aug. 4, 1999), 64 Fed. Reg. 43,255, 43,257
(Aug. 10, 1999). For a discussion of Executive Order 13,132 and its predecessors, see
Note & Comment, Presidential Power Grab or Pure State Might? A Modern Debate Over
Executive Interpretations on Federalism, 2000 B.Y.U.L. REV. 293.
7 64 Fed. Reg. at 43,257.
7 Executive Order 13,132 revoked an executive order issued by President
Reagan, which contained a virtually identical provision regarding pre-emption of state
law by administrative regulation.
Where a Federal statute does not preempt State law (as addressed in
subsection (a) of this section), Executive departments and agencies shall
construe any authorization in the statute for the issuance of regulations as
authorizing preemption of State law by rule-making only when the statute
expressly authorizes issuance of preemptive regulations or there is some
other firm and palpable evidence compelling the conclusion that the Congress
intended to delegate to the department or agency the authority to issue
regulations preempting State law.
Exec. Order No. 12,612 (Oct. 26, 1987), 52 Fed. Reg. 41,685 (Oct. 30, 1987). Whether
there is any meaningful difference between President Reagan's requirement of "firm
and palpable evidence," and President Clinton's requirement of "clear evidence" of
congressional intent to delegate the pre-emption power to an administrative agency is
a debatable albeit somewhat abstract inquiry.
73 Exec. Order No. 13,132, § 11, 64 Fed. Reg. at 43,259.
74 Id. § 6(c), at 43,258.
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on the relationship between the National Government and the
States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities
among the various levels of government,""
Applying the rule that a federal administrative agency
may pre-empt state law so long as it is acting within the
general scope of authority delegated by Congress, the Appellate
Division in County of Hudson found that New Jersey's century-
old policy against secret detentions had been overridden by the
sweep of Commissioner Ziglar's pen. The court first noted the
uncontroversial proposition that Congress has exclusive
authority over matters involving naturalization and
immigration,76 and then observed that the Immigration and
Nationality Act (INA) provides that the Attorney General
"shall establish such regulations; prescribe such forms of bond,
reports, entries, and other papers; issue such instructions; and
perform such other acts as he deems necessary for carrying out
his authority under the provisions of this Act."" Combining
these two provisions, the Appellate Division found that the
Attorney General, through his delegate, the Commissioner of
the INS, was authorized to promulgate the interim regulation
pre-empting state law mandating public disclosure of the
names of inmates in New Jersey county jails.
The Appellate Division did express reservations,
however, about the initial contention that the conditions of
confinement of INS detainees in state jails fell within the scope
of the INA:
Although there can be no question that, under the INA and its
implementing regulations, the Commissioner has the authority to
promulgate regulations relating to immigration and naturalization,
it may be open to question whether 8 C.F.R. § 236.6 actually
"relates" to immigration and naturalization, for the rule itself does
not purport to regulate the conduct or status of aliens, nor does it
address the legal processes afforded INS detainees. Rather, the
regulation deals solely with public access to records concerning
detainees. Thus, the real focus of the regulation, as evidenced by the
75 Interim Rule, supra note 29, at 19,511.
76 ACLU of New Jersey v. County of Hudson, 799 A.2d 629, 647 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 2002), cert. denied, 803 A.2d 1162 (N.J. 2002).
77 799 A.2d at 648 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(3)). The statute further
provided that the Attorney General was empowered to delegate his rule-making
authority to the Commissioner of the INS. Id. The INA has since been amended to vest
general rule-making power in the Secretary for Homeland Security. Homeland Security
Act of 2002, 107 Pub. L. No. 296, § 1102, 116 Stat. 2135, 2273 (Nov. 25, 2002).
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rationale presented in its preamble, may be seen to be on the
facilitation of law enforcement efforts in the wake of September 11."
Nevertheless, the court ultimately concluded that "we would
breach faith with overarching principles of our federalism if we
were to see this case as an occasion for viewing the grant of
authority to the Commissioner as anything but very broad."79 It
therefore held, albeit in somewhat reserved language,' that the
regulation fell within the ambit of federal immigration laws.
The correctness of this conclusion, however, is not self-
evident. The authority of the Attorney General and the
Commissioner under the INA to issue regulations pertaining to
immigration cannot extend any further than the scope of the
Act itself. Despite the general breadth of the rule-making
authority granted relative to the overall scope of the Act, the
boundaries of what Congress actually intended to govern
pursuant to the INA are limited. It overstates the law
considerably to assert that any regulation dealing with aliens
must therefore be a regulation of immigration and thus subject
to the plenary power of Congress to legislate and the Attorney
General and Commissioner to regulate. As Justice Brennan
held for the Court in DeCanas v. Bica,' "the Court has never
held that every state enactment which in any way deals with
aliens is a regulation of immigration and thus per se pre-
empted by this constitutional power, whether latent or
exercised." The Court then gave guidance to construing the
meaning and scope of the immigration power exercised by
Congress under the INA: "[Tihe fact that aliens are the subject
of a state statute does not render it a regulation of
immigration, which is essentially a determination of who
should or should not be admitted into the country, and the
conditions under which a legal entrant may remain.""2
7' ACLU of New Jersey v. County of Hudson, 799 A.2d at 648.
79 Id. at 648-49.
80 The court stated:
We accept as not patently unrealistic the government's assertion that the
regulation bears upon the privacy interests of those detainees who may not
want to have their names made public and that it tends to affect the safety of
the detainees and their families as well as others involved in the detention
scheme. The further assertion that the regulation affects ongoing
investigations into violations of the immigration laws is also not so far-
fetched as to invite disbelief.
Id. at 649.
81 424 U.S. 351, 355 (1976) (holding that a state law regulating employment
of illegal aliens not pre-empted by INA).
92 Id.
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The Plaintiffs in County of Hudson therefore asserted
that the Attorney General had not been given the power to
regulate in an area beyond the scope of the INA itself. Whether
the inmates held for the INS are subject to deportation,
voluntary departure, release on bond, are entitled to asylum, or
are subject to some other substantive immigration policy, is
concededly a matter subject to exclusive federal control. The
New Jersey statutes that require that a county jail's inmate
records be open to public inspection, however, do not address
"who should or should not be admitted into the country, and
the conditions under which a legal entrant may remain."
Substantive immigration issues are not implicated by the
requirement that the names of all inmates in New Jersey jails
(including but not limited to inmates held pursuant to contract
with the INS) be subject to public disclosure.
Once the Appellate Division concluded that the public
disclosure of the identities of INS detainees in county jails fell
within the ambit of federal immigration laws, however, it
quickly concluded that the general grant of authority delegated
to the Attorney General to "establish such regulations; . . .
issue such instructions; and perform such other acts as he
deems necessary for carrying out his authority under the
provisions of this Act"' empowered him to adopt the interim
regulation.
But while the INA certainly bestows broad rule-making
authority, that authority has its limits, and authorizes the
Attorney General only to promulgate regulations necessary "for
carrying out his authority under the provisions of this chapter."
The only relevant reference contained in the INA to federal
interaction with state government is the empowerment of the
Attorney General to arrange for "the housing, care, and
security of persons detained by the Service pursuant to Federal
law under an agreement with a State or political subdivision of
a State."5 This authorization to enter into a voluntary
agreement or contract with a state (or its political subdivisions)
hardly qualifies as a clear statement authorizing the Attorney
8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(3) (2000).
The United States also asserted the Attorney General has authority under
8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(2) to "control, directf], and supervis[e] . .. all [of the files and
records of the Service," empowering him to adopt the interim regulation. The Appellate
Division, however, declined to base its ruling on that provision, thus perhaps accepting
the argument that § 1103(a)(2) does not apply to the records maintained by Hudson
and Passaic Counties, because those records are not "records of the Service."
58 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(9)(A) (2000).
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General to pre-empt state law governing the substantive
conditions under which state jails are operated. To the
contrary, such language circumscribes the Attorney General's
power by authorizing him to enter only into those contractual
relationships to which the State chooses to agree. The
relationship intended by Congress between the federal
government and state entities expressed in the INA is
therefore one of arms-length contracting partners, not one of a
superior pre-empting authority over an inferior one.
Interpreting the INA as imposing such a limitation on
the grant of rule-making authority is consistent with - and
perhaps constitutionally mandated by - the longstanding
historical understanding that federal prisoners are kept in
state jails purely at the sufferance of state sovereignty.'
Indeed, not only is the limitation on the Attorney General's
rule-making power with regard to state-operated jails inherent
in the text of the INA itself, but that is how the Attorney
General himself interpreted his power - a least before the
exigencies of the September 11 detainees arose - when he
entered into contracts with the Hudson and Passaic County jail
facilities expressly providing that the manner of detention of
the inmates shall be governed by state law and local policies
and procedures." The interim regulation of April 17 was
therefore not only not "necessary for carrying out his authority
under the provisions of this Act," ' but in fact was in direct
contradiction to that authority under 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(9)(A),
as both the Attorney General himself exercised it when he
entered into intergovernmental service agreements with the
state jails,' and as Congress intended it under the general
statutory scheme permitting such agreements. Even under the
less deferential standards currently applied in determining the
efficacy of federal administrative regulations that endeavor to
pre-empt state law, therefore, the Attorney General's attempt
See supra Part III.
87 See supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(3) (2000).
89 The practical explanation as to why the INS often insisted in its
agreements that its detainees be treated under the same state and local laws and
procedures as state prisoners was to enhance its argument that state officials, not the
INS, were responsible for any substandard living conditions. See, e.g., Human Rights
Watch, Locked Away: Immigration Detainees In Jails In The United States (Sept.
1998), available at http://www.hrw.org/reports98/us-immig; Amnesty International,
Lost In The Labyrinth: Detention of Asylum-Seekers (Sept. 1999), available at
http://www.amnesty-usa.org/rightsforall/asylum/ins/ins-01.html.
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to regulate the manner in which New Jersey state authorities
record and disclose the identities of inmates held in their care
represents a marked departure not only from the text of the
relevant statutes, but perhaps more importantly, from the
consistent historical practice, which the federal government
had itself promoted, of exclusive local control of federal
prisoners in state jails.
V. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON FEDERAL REGULATION OF
THE OPERATION OF STATE JAILS: ANTI-COMMANDEERING
Perhaps the most novel claim raised by the plaintiffs in
ACLU of New Jersey v. County of Hudson was the
constitutional argument that "commandeering" state officials
to engage in secret detentions of federal inmates in a manner
contrary to state law is an unconstitutional derogation of state
autonomy and sovereignty that violates the Tenth Amendment
of the United States Constitution. The actual defendants in the
case, the Counties of Hudson and Passaic and the wardens and
keepers of the respective county jails, are entities and offices
created under the authority of the State of New Jersey. Their
power arises solely from the sovereignty of the State, and they
owe their obligations to the State. Even when they act as
jailors of federal prisoners, they do so in their capacity as state
officers, not federal employees.' For the federal government to
enact a regulation that forbids state officials from complying
with the dictates of state law raises at least the suggestion of
federal assumption of the powers of the state sovereign over its
own state officials.
Several recent United States Supreme Court cases have
rediscovered previously unexplored constitutional limits on the
ability of the federal government to control the apparatus of
state government. In New York v. United States," the Court
held unconstitutional a provision of federal law regulating the
disposal of radioactive wastes. The law required a state to
"take title" to any wastes within its borders that were not
otherwise properly disposed of. Justice O'Connor, writing for
the Court, found that putting states to the choice of "either
accepting ownership of waste or regulating according to the
instructions of Congress" would impermissibly "commandeer"
See supra Part III.
91 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
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state government to implement federal law." The scheme
embodied in the original Constitution was that the federal
sovereignty could regulate individuals but not the States. 3
"While Congress has substantial powers to govern the Nation
directly, including in areas of intimate concern to the States,
the Constitution has never been understood to confer upon
Congress the ability to require the States to govern according
to Congress' instructions. " '
New York's somewhat metaphorical reference to
"commandeering" state governments into the service of federal
regulatory purposes left some uncertainty concerning the type
of federal mechanisms it intended to forbid, and in Printz v.
United States" the Court attempted to provide greater clarity.
Printz struck down a provision in the Brady Act requiring state
law enforcement officers to conduct background checks on
prospective handgun purchasers. The Court held that:
The Federal Government may neither issue directives requiring the
States to address particular problems, nor command the States'
officers, or those of their political subdivisions, to administer or
enforce a federal regulatory program. It matters not whether
policymaking is involved, and no case-by-case weighing of the
burdens or benefits is necessary; such commands are fundamentally
incompatible with our constitutional system of dual sovereignty."
Thus, in the words of one commentator, Printz
"expressly rejected functionalism as a consideration in the
state sovereignty context, replacing it with a structural
formalism."" The Court expressly rejected the United States'
argument that "The Brady Act serves very important purposes,
is most efficiently administered by [local law enforcement
officers] ... and places a minimal and only temporary burden
upon state officers."' Printz therefore declared "categorically"
that the "Federal Government may not compel the States to
Id. at 161, 175.
" Id. at 166.
N Id. at 162 (citing Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 565 (1911)).
95 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
9 Id. at 935.
"7 Andrew S. Gold, Formalism and State Sovereignty in Printz v. United
States: Cooperation by Consent, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 247, 247 (1998).
See also Vicki C. Jackson, Federalism and the Uses and Limits of Law:
Printz and Principle?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2180 (1998) (criticizing Printz for its
"categorical" approach and arguing for more flexible multifactored standard).
98 521 U.S. at 931-32.
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enact or administer a federal regulatory program,"0 regardless
of the salutary purposes it might serve or the harm to federal
interests that might result as a consequence.
Definitional problems still arose after Printz, however,
as to the meaning of "commandeering," and the limits of federal
compulsion of state activities. In Reno v. Condon,'00 the Court
resolved the conflict among lower courts on the application of
New York and Printz to the Driver's Privacy Protection Act of
1994,"' which banned disclosure of state driver's license
personal information without the driver's consent." The Act's
provisions did not apply solely to States; it also regulated the
resale and redisclosure of drivers' personal information by
private persons who had obtained that information from a state
agency." The Court unanimously held that the federal statute
did not run afoul of the federalism and dual sovereignty
principles embodied in its previous cases. Although it agreed
that compliance with the federal law would "require time and
effort on the part of state employees," it rejected the State's
argument that the Act violated the principles laid down in
either New York or Printz "
We think, instead, that this case is governed by our decision in
South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505 (1988). In Baker, we upheld a
statute that prohibited States from issuing unregistered bonds
because the law "regulate[d] state activities," rather than "seek[ing]
to control or influence the manner in which States regulate private
parties."
Like the statute at issue in Baker, DPPA does not require the States
in their sovereign capacity to regulate their own citizens. The DPPA
regulates the States as the owners of databases. It does not require
the South Carolina Legislature to enact any laws or regulations, and
it does not require state officials to assist in the enforcement of
federal statutes regulating private individuals."
Id. at 933.
100 528 U.S. 141 (2000).
101 18 U.S.C. §§ 2721-2725 (1994).
102 Some states had historically sold driver's information for use by insurers,
manufacturers, direct marketers, and others engaged in interstate commerce to contact
drivers with customized solicitations. Condon, 528 U.S. at 141.
103 Id. at 146.
'04 Id. at 150.
" Condon, 528 U.S. at 150-51.
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The Court further noted that the Driver's Privacy Protection
Act regulated not merely the States, but "the universe of
entities that participate as suppliers to the market for motor
vehicle information," and thus was a law of general application
that did not regulate the States qua States.'0
With only three modern cases to serve as points of
reference for a somewhat opaque constitutional doctrine, it
might be overreaching to assert the existence of a clear
outcome with respect to the April 17 interim regulation. The
Appellate Division relied exclusively on Condon to reject the
plaintiffs contention that the April 17 interim regulation
promulgated by Commissioner Ziglar amounted to federal
"commandeering" of state officers to enforce federal law under
New York, and amounted to the Federal Government
compelling the States to "administer a federal regulatory
program" under Printz. 7  But apart from the April 17
regulation's superficial similarity with the statute at issue in
Condon - both of which forbade disclosure of personal
information - there are several factors that separate the two.
Condon distinguished Printz and New York by noting that the
statute at issue "does not require state officials to assist in the
enforcement of federal statutes regulating private
individuals."" Nor did the federal government in that case seek
"to control or influence the manner in which States regulate
private parties."' But that is precisely what the Commissioner
Ziglar's directive did in this case, since it affirmatively
" Id. at 151.
107 The Appellate Division rejected plaintiffs Tenth Amendment argument on
the basis of similarities with Condon.
In Reno v. Condon, the United States Supreme Court upheld a federal statute
that established a regulatory scheme to restrict the authority of the states to
disclose personal information contained in the records of state motor vehicle
departments. The Court observed that the Tenth Amendment precludes the
federal government from issuing directives requiring states to address
particular problems or commanding state officers to administer or enforce
federal regulatory programs.... Similarly, 8 C.F.R. § 236.6 does not require
New Jersey to enact any legislation, nor does it require State officials to
administer a federal regulatory scheme, or even to accept federal prisoners or
detainees. N.J.S.A. 30:8-2 represents a choice made by the State of New
Jersey, not one imposed by the federal government. Viewed in this light, 8
C.F.R. § 236.6 simply controls the type of information the State can release to
the public in respect of a subject matter committed to the plenary authority of
the federal government.
ACLU of New Jersey v. County of Hudson. 799 A.2d 629, 654-55 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 2002) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 803 A.2d 1162 (N.J. 2002).
108 528 U.S. at 151.
1"9 Id. at 150.
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enmeshed state officials in a federal regulatory program -
there being no clearer example of "regulation" than
incarceration - in a manner that affirmatively violated state
law. Requiring that holders of private individual information,
including state agencies, not disclose that information is one
thing; but both as an aspect of historical understanding and
doctrinal application, requiring that state jailers physically
incarcerate inmates in secret in contravention of state law is
quite another. Thus, a federal mandate that county jails take
custody of federal inmates in the secretive manner required by
federal policies and procedures appropriates the apparatus of
state government to implement a federal policy.
In Condon, the restraints placed upon state officials (as
well as private vendors in possession of the drivers license
data) were purely passive; they were not required to engage in
any affirmative activity in furtherance of a federal program,
but merely to refrain from distributing such information. Here,
however, the inexorable effect of the April 17 regulation and
the post hoc reneging on the terms of the intergovernmental
service agreements with Hudson and Passaic Counties, is that
state officials must now engage in the affirmative activity of
maintaining INS inmates in secret detention according to the
commands of their new federal superiors. And thus, unlike the
statute in Condon, the federal regulation "require[s] state
officials to assist in the enforcement of federal statutes
regulating private individuals."'10
As a practical matter, local state officials are attracted
to dealing directly with the federal government through
lucrative intergovernmental service agreements' and have
little incentive to be passionate about state policy against
secret detentions. But the willingness of jail officials in Hudson
and Passaic Counties to cede their authority to the federal
government should be constitutionally irrelevant. "Where
Congress exceeds its authority relative to the States, therefore,
the departure from the constitutional plan cannot be ratified by
110 Id. at 151.
... The intergovernmental service agreements with Hudson and Passaic
Counties provided for $77 per day per inmate to be paid by the United States. Housing
two hundred detainees for one hundred days would therefore yield over $1,500,000
paid directly into the local county sheriffs budget. Intergovernmental Service
Agreement between County of Hudson and the U.S. Department of Justice,
Immigration and Naturalization Service (Agreement No. ACB-5-I-0001);
Intergovernmental Service Agreement between Passaic County Jail and U.S.
Department of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service (Jan. 28, 1985).
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the 'consent' of state officials.".. 2 The state autonomy and
sovereignty that is at issue in this case is not for any individual
state official to give away. Moreover, state officials cannot
unilaterally abrogate a controlling state statute. Inmates
detained pursuant to the INS directive were held at the
Hudson and Passaic County jails only because county officials
entered into voluntary contracts with the INS. The express
terms of the service agreements between the counties and the
INS provide that local laws govern the manner of identification
and recording of detainees. "3
The structural "detour" mechanism validated by the
April 17 regulation has profound implications for federal-state
programs in the future, since it allows federal officials to (1)
contract with individual local state officials, (2) excise by
appropriate pre-empting regulation any inconvenient
limitations imposed by state law on the conduct of its own
officers, and (3) thereby effectively bypass the state as the
empowering sovereignty. The United States can thus provide
immunity from a state official's obligation to abide by state law,
simply by promulgating a regulation that forbids him from
doing so. In light of ongoing attempts to shift, or at least share,
law enforcement responsibilities previously exercised by
federal officers with state officials in connection with the war
on terrorism,' validation of this mechanism of federal-local
cooperation, thereby bypassing state limitations, could have
significant federalism implications.
112 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 182 (1992).
113 Intergovernmental Service Agreement between County of Hudson and U.S.
Department of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service (Agreement No. ACB-
5-1-0001) art. IV(a).
114 See, e.g., Clear Law Enforcement for Criminal Alien Removal Act of 2003,
H.R. 2671, 108th Cong. ("CLEAR Act"). The controversial CLEAR Act would authorize
"law enforcement personnel of a State or a political subdivision of a State . . . to
investigate, apprehend, detain, or remove aliens in the United States . . . in the
enforcement of the immigration laws of the United States." Id. § 101. The bill further
provides, however, that a State
that fails to have in effect a statute that expressly authorizes law
enforcement officers of the State, or of a political subdivision within the
State, to enforce Federal immigration laws in the course of carrying out the
officer's law enforcement duties shall not receive any of the funds that would
otherwise be allocated to the State under section 241(i) of the Immigration
and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1231(i)).
Id. § 102(a). Moreover, state and local law enforcement must provide information about
apprehended illegal aliens to the Department of Justice and the Department of
Homeland Security within 10 days "in such form and in such manner as the Attorney
General may by regulation or guideline require." Id. § 105(a). Failure to provide such
information likewise would result in deprivation of federal funding.
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But counties and their officials are bound whenever
possible to exercise their prerogatives and official discretion
consistent with state law and policy, and thus could not
initially enter into a voluntary contract that requires them to
violate such state law. To do so would amount to a breach of a
fiduciary duty owed by state officials to their sovereign. The
only solution to this conundrum would be for county officials, in
order to reconcile their obligations to the State of New Jersey
with the proscriptions of the Ziglar directive, to terminate
immediately the intergovernmental service agreements with
the INS and refuse to enter into any further contracts that
require them to violate state law prohibiting secret detentions.
But a federal agency should not, through unilateral and
retroactive imposition of a "secret detention" rule upon state
officials, be able to force those state officials to become
complicit in a federal detention program whose terms violate a
state statute's policy.
VI. CONCLUSION
The directive of Commissioner Ziglar of April 17, 2002,
is an attempt to turn a voluntary obligation assumed by a state
official pursuant to an intergovernmental contract into an
involuntary duty to violate state law. For the federal
government to be able to impose conditions on the county jails
to compel them to engage in secret detention - conduct that the
New Jersey Legislature has declared to be against public policy
- signals a significant reworking of the structures by which
federal and state agencies engage in cooperative efforts. It is
unclear that Congress, in granting rule-making power to the
Attorney General, intended to authorize such restructure.
Moreover, the practical implications of permitting direct
agreements between federal and local law enforcement officials
to bypass state control over those local officials may encourage
a novel method of intergovernmental cooperation that could
dilute the historical and constitutional understandings
underlying our federalism.
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